George Devereux: In Memoriam

George Devereux slipped beyond the Great Divide on May 28, 1985. His death marks a substantial loss to psychoanalysis and psychological anthropology. An astonishingly erudite, brilliant, creative, and difficult man, Devereux has invited stories that often make him appear comical and quixotic. Certainly for those who knew him, Saint George did have his dragons, whether in the form of wives, enemies, critics, or internal demons. However, beneath the stories—his own or those about him—one encounters both tragedy and genius.

George Devereux went through two names, two religions, five disciplines, and many marriages. Yet he never felt he had found his place in the sun. His quest was at once physical, intellectual, and spiritual. Driven by a sense of homelessness, he took considerable trouble in his last years to arrange for his cremated remains to be transported from France to the Mohave burial grounds in Parker, Arizona, where he was given a ritual Mohave funeral.

A Hungarian whose family lands were invaded by the Rumanians in his childhood, he first envisioned a career as a concert pianist, later studying composition with Walter Piston. He left Hungary (then Rumania) while in his late teens to go to Paris, where he studied physics under Marie Curie. His first cousin, Edward Teller, was to become well known as a physicist. Devereux's was not to be a career in physics, however, although the influence of theoretical physics in his work runs very deep. He fell seriously ill in Paris. After months of hospitalization and convalescence, he began work with a publishing house and, when he was well enough, cast about for a way of pursuing a university career. Then, one Saturday afternoon in winter he met Marcel Mauss at the École Pratique des Hautes Études and persuaded him to accept

1. This paper has been immeasurably improved by the generous criticism of several friends and colleagues to whom I am most grateful: Bryce Boyer, Melford Spiro, and Robert J. Stoller.
one more student. Some time in 1932 Devereux, who had been born into a Jewish family, was baptized a Catholic and changed his name from Dobro to Devereux, becoming French in name as well.

In Paris, Devereux studied under both Mauss and Lucien Levy-Bruhl, the latter a much underestimated figure whose work in philosophy, epistemology, and the history of the social sciences deserves as much re-evaluation as do his books on non-European forms of thinking, belief, and logic (primitive mentality). Both these mentors profoundly influenced Devereux; both encouraged him to the United States. Arrangements were made for him to do his doctoral work under Kroeber at Berkeley. The fieldwork among the Mohave, which he began under Kroeber's guidance, led to lasting attachments with the Mohave, even though he did not get along with Kroeber. That he had his remains buried in Parker in the Mohave tradition attests to the depth of these bonds.

Partly because he was not being heard in anthropology, Devereux sought psychoanalytic training. Karl Menninger brought him to Topeka in the days when the Menninger Clinic was one of the liveliest places in the world for creative explorations in psychoanalysis and psychoanalytically oriented research. In the fifties and sixties, George practiced psychoanalysis in New York City.

Devereux had written roughly 150 articles and at least half a dozen books and had emerged as one of the great pioneers of psychological anthropology when he decided to return to France and begin yet another career, this time as a classicist. He studied Greek and moved to Paris, where he occupied his first permanent university position, at the Ecole Pratique. Thus Devereux's quest led him back to the same university where Mauss had taught; and having returned home he met his seminars on Saturday afternoons, the same day and time that Mauss had chosen. Moreover, for his "homecoming" he decided to learn ancient Greek, the subject Mauss had mastered but of which Devereux was ignorant at the time of their meeting. Several years after beginning ancient Greek, he was invited to All Souls College at Oxford by E. R. Dodds and others as an All Souls scholar for a year, all expenses paid.

In the pages that follow I shall piece together what I see to be the relationship between the man and his achievements, endeavoring to be faithful to Devereux's ideas concerning the importance of anxiety—individual, cultural, and universal—in all scientific work. Devereux realized that he was able to write what he did because he was a Hungarian who sojourned in France and lived in the United States; he knew that what he did was a testament to what he was—and could not be.

Much can be said about the nature of Devereux's curiosity; much can be made of the kinds of specific problems that he addressed in his hundreds of papers. I shall concentrate here on From Anxiety to Method in Behavioral Science (1967), the work that best establishes Devereux's lasting reputation in the social sciences, anthropology, and psychoanalysis. An adequate understanding of this book—more than anything else he wrote—encourages, and indeed requires, some acquaintance with George's world. Significantly, the book is dedicated to Marcel Mauss, his mentor at the Ecole Pratique.

The central argument of this volume is simple: The sciences of man will never become even reasonably reliable until those who practice them recognize the part played in their theories and their scholarly activities by their own anxieties and fantasies. Unconscious processes affect the scientific endeavor, Devereux argued, in the framing of the materials selected for observation and in the assessment of those interactions on which fieldwork is based. He is quite plain: "...behavioral science data arouse anxieties, which are ward off by a countertransference inspired pseudomethodology; this maneuver is responsible for nearly all the defects of behavioral science." The only way of founding the behavioral sciences more firmly is to "attack the greatest complexities frontally, by means of the extremely practical device of treating the difficulty per se as a fundamental datum not to be evaded, but to be exploited to the utmost—not to be explained, but to be used as an explanation of seemingly simpler data" (p. xvi).

In other words, if the sciences of man arouse anxiety, one must not compulsively attempt to alleviate the anxiety, but rather understand what it means. This is especially so because the more anxiety a phenomenon arouses, the "less man seems capable of observing it correctly, of thinking about it objectively and of evolving adequate methods for its description, understanding, control and prediction" (p. 2).

If this is the case—and Devereux presents convincing evidence that it is—then the primary task facing the behavioral sciences is the appropriate and rigorous analysis of the observer's anxieties. For until these are clarified, holds Devereux, we cannot know what it is we are observing; because so much energy goes into distorting and allaying the anxiety itself, we cannot clearly see the object of our investigations or adequately analyze the process of our explorations.
Before proceeding, let us step back and examine the thesis together with what we know of Devereux's life. A Hungarian who left his Rumanian-occupied home, lived in France, and then came to the United States talks about the importance of the observer's feelings. "Look at me, the observer! What I think as an observer is of value to science; I do not have to become just like the stereotypical observers who do not matter for the descriptions of what they are observing!" And if this "Look, Mom, no hands" analysis of anxiety seems extraneous, consider the life that Devereux led. His life finds a place as a background to his book, which he felt the best thing he ever did. Furthermore, let us assume that the anxiety is real, however it chooses to express itself.

As Freud noted in his Interpretation of Dreams, the dream of a fire which awakens the dreamer is to be taken seriously, for even if the fire is imaginary, the fear is real. Given this assumption, let us consider the links Devereux makes between his own anxieties as an individual (the Hungarian who went to Paris, changed name and religion, went through five professions, and so on), and the anxieties he claimed must be understood as the basis on which to found future social science.

By placing the observer's anxieties at the center of the behavioral sciences, of course, Devereux is arguing for the importance of the observer qua individual. Logically, such an argument is the counterpart of the idea that the informant is also an individual, who must be assumed to manifest not only the modal personality he is purported to share with other members of his culture, but also his own idiosyncratic individuality. As a result, his accounts of cultural life are necessarily distorted by purpose, context, and defenses. But by making both informant and observer of significance as individuals, Devereux necessarily raises the specter of relativism.

Thus, one must necessarily conclude that the data are skewed in different ways by the observer as an individual as well as by the informants; the very difficulties of the observer are to be used, as are the frustrations and reactions to which these difficulties give rise. In this respect, Devereux questions the assumptions about culture as a system, perceived independently of the observer's blind spots and purposes, his or her background and psychodynamics. He explicitly refutes claims of cultural relativism. Cultural relativism, he believes,

makes individuals of any given culture pawns of what are construed by the observer to be the rules of the cultural system. For cultural relativists there may be differences between cultures, but within each culture, members abide by what they see to be the desirable values and goals; there is little disagreement or difference in the ways these are perceived or desired, or in the efforts made to achieve goals recognized as worthwhile. Thus the perceptual relativism advocated by Devereux is quite distinct from the cultural relativism of anthropologists like Leslie White, Marvin Opler, and others.

Not until the observer's understanding of himself as observer, and his recognition of his differences with the informants, become part of the data to be analyzed, can the behavioral sciences be set on firmer ground. Thus, Devereux's stand opposes cultural relativism, according to which the doings of people are "only observed," not reacted to, and the observer's judgments have no place whatsoever in the understanding of this material. There is, in fact, a modern cult of psychoanalytic thinking that holds that observers will have no anxieties to overcome if only they can manage to empathize adequately with the patient. Such positions imply a psychological relativism analogous to the cultural relativism against which Devereux argued so cogently.

In the light of Devereux's background as a Hungarian Jew cum French Catholic in the United States, why might he have insisted so strenuously on individual differences becomes a matter worth considering. He is speaking about the value of his own individualism; he is not simply an American anthropologist talking about how individuals conform or do not conform to what society holds to be the model of conduct and "normal" behavior about which no observer can make any value judgments. He is a Hungarian who lives and works in

of the doctrine of cultural relativism are useful in this context. The first deals with the extent to which the observer is believed to be capable of abstracting himself or herself from the values of the culture to which he or she belongs, in order to be "objective" and "nonjudgmental" about the values of the culture studied. What the Bonga-Bonga do is ipso facto good for the Bonga-Bonga. Thus, in this sense, cultural relativism implies that the observer be in a state of innocence and grace unequalled even by the newborn. The observer "just observes and collects"; he does not theorize about what he is doing, let alone about what he thinks he is doing. The second implication of cultural relativism useful in this context pertains to the hostility against claims that a concept of universal human nature has any relevance for anthropology or sociology. Thus, questions of how Mohave beliefs in dreamed creation myths respond to human needs for cultural values, for example, are never asked by cultural relativists. Nor are questions pertaining to any judgments about the "health" or "illness" of the culture studied. Devereux sought to define criteria of normality and abnormality in pan-human terms, such that cultural values could then be understood in a larger context of a theory of human nature.

2. Cultural relativism is a term whose full elucidation would require a monograph on American cultural anthropology. Franz Boas and his students are frequently associated with cultural relativism, which in many ways has defined the major developments in American anthropology since the beginning of the century. Two implications
America at a time when Boasian (i.e., German-American) models dominate the field. He is a gadfly reminding American cultural relativists that their relativism is itself relative to their own discipline and culture.

When he says that the Sedang are wretchedly cruel people and the Mohave are delightful and sexually creative, he is expressing something of his own human and subjective (and Hungarian) reactions, which are part of the picture to be seen and understood. One possible explanation for his publishing virtually nothing on the Sedang (about which he had reams of notes) was that he hated them and did not want to delve into what they represented for him. Clearly, he idealized the Mohave, in whom he had found a good mother in the Winnicottian sense. Like Freud, he needed both a sweet friend and a bitter enemy. Many times I tried to persuade him to publish Sedang materials. He responded either with indifference, saying he had more important things to do, or with vituperation, stating unambiguously that he violently hated the Sedang. Committed as he was to the principles enunciated in From Anxiety to Method, he could not have dealt with the Sedang without also dealing with his own reactions to them, without dealing with his own anxieties as observer in that situation. That he was disinclined to do. Perhaps because he needed to idealize the Mohave he needed also to vilify the Sedang.

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Let us return now to Devereux's conceptions of data and of the scientific method. He writes:

A phenomenon becomes a datum for a particular science only through being explained in terms of the characteristic intervening variables of that science. No phenomenon, no matter how limited and specific, belongs a priori to any particular discipline. It is assigned to a particular discipline through the manner in which it is explained and it is this 'assigning' which transforms a phenomenon (event) into a datum, and, specifically, into the datum of a particular discipline. Just as there exist no pre-assigned phenomenon, so there exist no unassigned data [p. 16].

Or, to say roughly the same thing, Devereux relies on Poincaré's principle that "method is the choice of facts," adding that "it is simply a matter of agreeing on what one considers relevant in a given context" (p. 16).

Of course, one can disagree with Devereux's claims, but what remains of importance in his valiant attempt to construct a theory of evidence based on ideas about method, an attempt he continued in his work on the principle of complimentarity in the sciences of man (Ethnopsychanalyse complinariste). These efforts to develop an epistemology for the sciences of man are a mainstay of From Anxiety to Method (1967). In fact, he says clearly that the theoretical problems raised by Sapir's discussions of the "Two-Crows deny this" [informants can disagree] are the very ones to which the second part of the book is dedicated. "I not only propose to recognize the existence and scientific import of divergences between the reports of two behavioral scientists, but also to correlate them with their respective personalities, with the structural and functional complexities of their own cultural background and also with that of the culture which they studied" (p. 43). This remark again points up Devereux's insistence on a theoretical framework allowing for individual differences, both in informants and observers.

Individual differences in observers—such as those in shamans ("Individual Ritual Differences in Mohave Shamanism")—cannot be understood in terms of conscious ideation alone. The very notion of anxiety used by Devereux implies unconscious dimensions of which the observers may well not be aware, either because their professional defenses screen these from them, or because they themselves are unaware of the inevitability of anxiety reactions to behavioral science data.

Because "man acts with panic to the unresponsiveness of matter" (p. 32), he needs to deny unresponsiveness and "to control his panic." This need induces him "to interpret physical occurrences animistically, and to impute to them meanings which they do not possess, so as to be able to experience them as responses. When such perceived responses cannot be elicited, man imagines (hallucinates) them" (p. 33).

Anxiety is crucial for child development (animism), the prototype of all panic being the child's inevitable experience of the unresponsiveness of the mother to his needs. Therefore a tendency toward animism is present in all adults as the product of the human family (p. 32). Were the unresponsiveness of matter not a trauma for all human beings, then "meanings" would not be imputed to events, activities, feelings, and the like, and human understanding, communication, and experience as we know them could not exist. Hence, the very conditions under which there would be no distortion in the behavioral sciences are at best hypothetical.
In short, basic hypotheses about the nature of anxiety, of the human family, of the individuality of the observer all contribute to Devereux’s ideas about the foundations of the behavioral sciences. In other words, the human need to deal with the trauma of the unresponsiveness of matter underlies the imputation of meaning to our various worlds: physical, social, and psychological. If this proposition be admitted, then it follows that a behavioral science without anxiety is one without meaning. Seen this way, the anxiety of the behavioral scientist represents a source of distortion and meaning, and meaning in distortion.

Devereux reminds us that the concern of the book is “the limited problem of the distinctive nature of behavioral data and of the theoretical framework which treats life-phenomena as life-phenomena and not as something else” (p. 96). Thus he is not concerned with the anxieties that may or may not enter into the data of the physical sciences. Every method, every theoretical construction grows up in the context of and in response to the reactions and anxieties of the observer. Therefore, argues Devereux, “a great many professional defenses are simply varieties of the isolation defense which ‘decontaminates’ anxiety-arousing material by repressing or negating its affective content and human as well as personal relevance” (p. 83). Thus the affective reactions that behavioral science data produce are specifically linked to questions of theory and method in the behavioral sciences and are not necessarily the same as those encountered in the physical sciences.

To illustrate these anxieties Devereux mentions both the irrational in sexual research and the failure of anthropologists to take seriously the “sciences” of non-European (primitive) peoples. Nonaccidental psychiatric theories do have something to contribute to the understanding of psychiatric disorders (p. 122). Among other things they prompt us to see the cultural frameworks used by observers in the behavioral sciences, it being inconceivable that any observer should command his ethnic character to hover in midair. Moreover, ethnic character, “which implies the adoption of a culturally determined point of view or frame of reference for the appraisal of reality, is a major source of distortions” (p. 135). Furthermore, the status of being human confers importance on the self-relevance of research in the behavioral sciences, such that self-models affect purportedly objective theories as various as those of “race,” “adaptation,” and “psychiatric diagnoses.”

The imputation of meaning to the social and cultural environment is, holds Devereux, a basic expression of the tendency of the human mind to alleviate the panic engendered by the unresponsiveness of matter. Man needs “to deny physical occurrences anistically, and to impute to them ‘meanings’ which they do not possess, so as to be able to experience them as ‘responses.’” This human need emerges as perhaps the most fundamental trait of the human mind. “If stimuli interpretable as ‘response’ are not forthcoming, man tends to substitute an illusory response for the (inappropriately) expected response which is not forthcoming” (p. 33). As there are inevitably individual and cultural, as well as human, factors in the so-called animistic ideas of primitives and in the so-called scientific ideas of behavioral scientists, Devereux proposes that these factors be assessed and used in both theory and method. There is no reason a priori to believe that non-European ideas about psychiatric disorders are necessarily more heavily laden with hallucinatory distortions than are our own. Furthermore, since it is an essential feature of the human mind to respond to the perceived (and unconsciously fantasized) unresponsiveness of matter, any behavioral science that pretends to truth—but fails to take anxiety reactions into account—is necessarily built on sand.

If human beings react to the unresponsiveness of matter with anxiety, and if such anxiety constitutes an essential part of the data (and therefore of the methods) of the behavioral sciences, it follows that the eliciting of data from informants is necessarily “disturbance,” which must be understood in terms not only of the informant’s, but also of the observer’s, reactions (countertransference) to the situation thereby created. This means, explains Devereux, that both transference and countertransference are elicited. The task at hand in extending psychoanalytic epistemology to the other behavioral sciences entails the exploitation of disturbances recognized to have been produced by observation. We must “find out what positive insights—not obtainable by other means—we can derive from the fact that the presence of an observer (who is of the same order of magnitude as that which he observes) disturbs the observed event” (p. 270).

Furthermore, the data thus obtained are particularly useful because they indicate the living reactions to disturbance. “Any unprecedented situation tests the range, scope and adaptability of a system” (p. 272) and of the people who create such systems. In the case of anthropology, for example, much can be learned by analyzing the disturbance caused by the presence, personality, and activities of the anthropolo-
gist, a disturbance specific to that kind of situation. The kind of situation is, of course, influenced by the expectations, perceptions, training and motivations of the anthropologist, as well as by the uses to which he intends to put his fieldwork (for example, the writing of an ethnography). Because only the statements the observer makes about his own statements can be assessed by readers, only when the observer is both the observer and observed can he intelligibly make the statement, “And this I observe.” This is so particularly because, as Devereux remarks “the disturbance occurs ‘within’ the observer, and it is this disturbance which is then experienced as the real stimulus and treated as the relevant datum” (p. 301).

In other words, the analysis of any disturbance (whether one encountered by a psychoanalyst, an anthropologist, or a sociologist) requires that the observer be capable of describing that disturbance in terms not only of cultural categories (collective representations and sentiments) but also of idiosyncratic differences. Such an analysis of a disturbance cannot be complete without an assessment of the psychological dynamics of what Devereux, departing from standard psychoanalytic usage, calls “transference” and “countertransference.” Disturbances may be understood in terms of Fromm’s distinction between healthy adjustment and sadomasochistic conformism, in terms of the ethnic unconscious or unconscious conflicts on which a particular culture capitalizes, in terms of neuroses of sanity or the neurotic compulsion to seem normal, or indeed in terms of antisocial social ideals.

The second book of Devereux’s that I shall treat here, Basic Problems of Ethnopsychiatry, (also dedicated to the memory of Marcel Mauss) can be seen to elaborate the arguments he lays out in From Anxiety to Method. In this work he asks how studying characteristic patterns of neurosis and psychosis can contribute to anthropology. There are, Devereux notes, ethnic disorders in all cultures (for example, amok in Malaysia, arctic hysteria in the Arctic, schizophrenia in Western Europe and the U.S.). Jung (1928) observed: ‘We always find in the patient a conflict that at a certain point is connected with the great problems of society… Neurosis is thus, strictly speaking, nothing less than an individual attempt, however unsuccessful, at the solution of a universal problem’. In the attempt at the solution of a universal, human problem it is necessary and inevitable that cultural models will be used (for instance, models of misconduct in Linton’s sense or antisocial social ideals). Furthermore, no analysis of what causes the psychosis of John Doe can be complete without an explanation of why Richard Roe, beset with similar problems and conflicts, has

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become neither antisocial nor psychotic. What links John Doe to Richard Roe thus implies a cultural matrix. Once this is admitted, then, for example, the series surgeon, anatomist, butcher, assassin, homicidal maniac appears as a continuum to be analyzed in terms of cultural meanings and cultural context: For us, the anatomist is a valued member of society; in the Middle Ages he was perceived as a mad vampire.

Such problems are disturbing for the behavioral scientist, whose reactions and defenses are inevitably going to be affected by cultural values, models and patterns. For example, in “The Cannibalic Impulses of Parents” (1980:122-137), Devereux plainly states that the “singular lack” of psychoanalytic interest in the entire question of the cannibalic impulses of adults toward children is a significant datum, an explanation of which requires the analysis of “both psychologically and culturally determined scotomizations” (p. 122). Or consider a second example, Devereux’s study, “Female Sexual Juvenile Delinquency in a Puritanical Society” (p. 155-184). In this paper he discusses female juvenile sex delinquency “from the viewpoint of psychoanalytically oriented social science.” Because “the anxiety-arousing nature of this problem has deeply affected current theoretical and therapeutic views,” his first task will have to be a careful scrutiny of the “scientific definition and treatment of such girls from the viewpoint of the Wissenssociologie of psychiatry” (p. 156). Devereux also reminds us that human beings can be destructive in many ways, only a few of which are labeled “delinquent, “antisocial,” or “abnormal,” and that such labeling is a selective process profoundly influenced by culture. He criticizes the labeling of theorists who emphasize epidemiology and do not lend credence to the discrepancies between language and thought. Because they are too preoccupied with linguistic analysis and categories, they are too preoccupied with linguistic analysis and categories, they cannot allow themselves to be disturbed by questions concerning the specific cultural meanings of the disease entities they claim to be studying.

But there is more here. One begins to expect that Devereux will provide us with an analysis of 1) what he sees to be the cultural disorders of our own society; 2) the ways in which our own cultural values, scotomizations, and models influence the process by which certain persons acquire the status of being “mad”; and 3) the cultural dimensions of all successful psychoanalyses. And, indeed, one can find his contributions to all of these problems.

If signal symptoms are culturally conventionalized signals used to communicate about insane status, and if every signal symptom entails
an attack on major social values, then one dimension of diagnosis is the transformation of an idiosyncratic singularity of behavior into a form in which it can be communicated about, a process of reinforcement in the learning-theory sense of the word. Such a process allows for the use by individuals of cultural materials. Thus, Devereux argues, schizophrenia (or, some might say, narcissistic disorders) is both as prevalent as it is the United States and Europe and as relatively intractable to treatment precisely because of its cultural supports, which practicing psychiatrists and psychotherapists and psychoanalysts have a personal stake in not seeing. “I believe schizophrenia to be almost incurable not only because it has an organic basis but because its principal symptoms are systematically encouraged by some of the most characteristic and powerful—but also most senseless and useless (dysfunctional)—“values” in our civilization.” Therefore, schizophrenia is important in our understanding of our culture. And the converse is equally true: our culture is important in understanding schizophrenia. Moreover, it is equally pertinent in enabling the therapist to recognize in himself or herself those persona or introjects cast in one of culture’s plays.

As Devereux observes, the therapist’s effectiveness “can be hampered quite as much by his ethnocentric and cultural blindnesses and blind spots as by his unconscious idiosyncratic counter-transference reactions.” (1980:214) From this it follows that the training of any psychotherapist is incomplete unless it is analytic, unless “the future therapist ceases to scotomize not only his subjective conflicts but also the objective ones of the society into which he was born and in which he functions as a psychotherapist” (p. 215). One hears in these lines not only the Hungarian practicing in New York, but also the Hungarian who values the independence and intellectual freedom that his position in a “different” culture gives him. He, as a therapist, has two sets of cultural scotomizations to sort out and recognize. In fact, having a dual cultural background is valuable for the therapist; it obliges him to examine his own cultural scotomizations as well as those of the culture (or rather of the members of the culture) in which he practices.

3. While it could certainly be objected that the WHO surveys have demonstrated that schizophrenia is universally prevalent in nearly equal proportions, such an epidemiological approach does not necessarily invalidate the thrust of Devereux’s argument. What he is arguing is that cultural values contribute to the mise en scène of psychopathology and that, just as therapeutic action depends on interpersonal interactions and social values, so does the pathology itself. He also says that not all disorders pose threats of the same gravity to the social body. One wishes that his diagnosis of social ills and his evaluation of psychiatric disorders had been integrated in a theoretically more compelling fashion. In this instance, as in others, Devereux’s bold claims obscure the value of his insights.

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Therefore, we might expect that in some respects immigrants practicing psychotherapy in this country (or anywhere else) can ipso facto be more aware than are we Americans of the ways cultural values support both what psychotherapists and psychoanalysts do and do not do. In that sense, the “Americanization” of psychoanalysis has perhaps impoverished the discipline because it has not been accompanied by an adequate understanding of the cultural dimensions of psychoanalytic practice, one that can be made part of psychoanalytic education.

Devereux’s argument extends to what makes psychoanalysis effective in our society. The invention of psychoanalysis by Freud would not have been possible anywhere. “Only members of a society in which segmental and impersonal relations are the main fabric of society could have devised the psychoanalytic method” (p. 226). Obviously, this is not to say that psychoanalysis cannot be effective in other cultures also. It is rather to emphasize that our here-and-now understanding of how psychoanalysis functions in our culture requires that we examine, probe, and tolerate all dimensions of our anxieties—the cultural, the idiosyncratic, and the human.

Simply because the Greeks, who bequeathed to us so much, happened to have been among the first peoples to differentiate between the categories of reality and imagination does not mean that issues behind these categories are any less problematic and anxiety arousing for us than they are for other societies in which there is no such distinction in categories. Ancient Greece had no prevalent mental illness of the gravity of schizophrenia or the narcissistic disorders and was therefore able to produce the Parthenon and Aeschylus, Thucydides and Plato. Indeed, what makes psychoanalysis effective can be related to what makes schizophrenia or the affective or narcissistic disorders pernicious. In our culture the ethnic neurosis (or psychosis) happens to be a condition more serious than hysteria. Therefore, implies Devereux, our culture is ailing, a point made by Durkheim and others. While anomic and suicide were treated by Durkheim as symptoms of a social ill, schizophrenia is analyzed by Devereux as at once an individual and a cultural (social) fact.

It appears then that Devereux and Durkheim had similar missions: to diagnose social ills, to describe to us what is wrong with the social body. Moreover, both men pursued their ambitions by drawing on the European tradition of a science of man, a global epistemology that seeks to restore wholeness to a fragmented world. Unlike Durkheim, whose epistemology, idealism, and theories of social sentiments and collective representations resemble a magnificent theological system, Devereux writes no book that is aesthetically pleasing; his arguments
are often tough and hardgoing; he loads his articles with cases and often loses that sense of style and proportion, of flow and movement which we enjoy in Freud, Frazer or Durkheim. Nonetheless, it is Devereux’s genius to make his own anxieties speak and by so doing enable us to hear things in ourselves. In an increasingly dehumanized world, such efforts are enormously important.

Perhaps more than any other scholar of his generation—and some might say of this century—Devereux intuitively sensed the limitations of both Freud and Durkheim and tried to elaborate a comprehensive epistemology embracing complimentary psychological and sociological perspectives in which unconscious forces and anxieties on both individual and cultural levels can be discerned, analyzed and made part of the behavioral sciences. Although he was often unsuccessful in his herculean effort and did not achieve in his lifetime recognition for his contributions to the epistemology of the social sciences, he certainly deserves our admiration and respect for having devoted his life to so monumentally important a task.

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