

Article

ON DREAMS, IMAGINATIVE KNOWING AND NOT KNOWING: APPEARANCE, IDENTITY, AND SHAME

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This paper explores the relation of concepts of the unconscious to notions of the imagination, and both to the dynamics of shame. In this discussion dreams occupy a central place, since they are so intimately related to human relationships and to the human imagination. What is seen, not seen, concealed, relied upon for others not to understand, and what is imagined in the responses of others and of oneself—these are essentially shame dynamics, since our identity is determined by relationships.

KEY WORDS: dreams; shame; the unconscious; imagination; imaginative knowing

<https://doi.org/10.1057/s11231-019-09176-4>

APPEARANCE AND IDENTITY

One of the surprising features of human existence is our inability to know who we appear to others to be, and therefore how necessary it is to depend both on others and on our own imaginations. Beginning in the womb, identity, however construed, is rooted in relationships. So, the very notion of an identity independent of relationships is a fiction, although a powerful one. From the perspective of appearance, narcissism is evidence of dependence on others to reflect what one wants to see in oneself. As Pirandello noted:

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When the eyesight of the others doesn't help us establish somehow in ourselves the reality of what we see, our eyes no longer know what they are seeing; our awareness is confused, because what we believe to be our most personal attribute, our awareness, means the others in us; and we can never feel alone. (Pirandello, 1933, p. 105.)

Given the primacy of relationships in identity, it is striking that individual will, independent of relationships, has been emphasized by Nietzsche, Freud and others (e.g., Christian Scientists, Behaviorists, etc.), at the same time as narcissism has been vilified as egoistic preoccupation, splendid, willful, self-satisfying isolation. An emphasis on individual will hides the central importance of relationships. When guilt is assumed to be internal and shame assumed to be external, this misconception tends further to contribute to narcissistic illusions, while disguising human vulnerability and limitation (see Gondar, 2018).

In my book, *Disappearing Persons: shame and appearance* (Kilborne, 2002), I suggest that all efforts to control our appearance are simultaneously attempts to imagine who we are in the eyes of others and to control how we feel about ourselves. In our appearance-driven society these attempts often lead to anxiety about disappearing behind the images relied upon. We are caught between a longing for recognition and a terror of being seen (pp. 26–29). Exacerbated by cultural forces, this conflict, together with the emotions generated, leads to ever more reliance on “seeming.”

Psychoanalysis has traditionally focused on the individual rather than on the individual in relationships, although this historical emphasis has been challenged. When there is a shift, as with Jung, the collective unconscious tends to become a repository of archetypes and symbols, which equally blurs the importance of relationships.

The importance of relationships for identity, perception and psychic life has been further obscured by contemporary notions of the unconscious. These can be compared with the larger notion of Saint Augustine (Brown, 1967). His *abyssus humanae conscientiae* (the abyss of human consciousness) evokes the expanses essential in considering human emotions. Augustine's *abyssus* “is always what others do not know of you.”² Naturally what others do not know about you casts doubts upon what you can know of yourself. There is an unbridgeable gulf between what others hold as images of ourselves and our own sense of self. For Augustine, “Conscientia is an abyss and not just a metaphor” (Peter Brown, personal communication, 2016), an observation that underscores our vast world of incomprehension, how very little we can know of what others think of us, yet how dependent we are on what we can piece together in the patchwork of our own identities. By contrast, the unconscious of psychoanalysis has little to do with what others do not know of you.

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Defining the unconscious as the unconscious of one person simplifies matters in the same way Freud simplified dream interpretation by extrapolating from his own experience. As far as we can tell from what he has written, Freud never heard himself tell a dream to another human being.³

Rather, he was listening to himself and his own imagination, without another soul to ask him what he meant, without the possibility that Freud might realize his listener was not listening. Moreover, because Freud assumed that his dreams were what he wrote them down to be, he confined dreams to narcissistic silence, conferring upon them a timelessness belonging to the literary tradition, whereas dreams are quintessentially oral and aural events never to be repeated in the same way and dependent upon listeners. No extrapolation, however satisfying narcissistically, can ever provide a substitute for a human connection that necessarily limits what one can know both about oneself and the world. Such human connections broaden the human imagination by challenging narcissistic investments and illusions.

SHAME, INCOMPLETENESS AND HUMAN CONNECTIONS

The problem of self-perception and self-knowledge draws upon resources of vulnerability and human limitation, which Adam Smith (1759) in the 18th century called "fellow feeling". Today this is referred to as "empathy," a strange admixture of feelings and imaginings, dependent as it is on the experience of others and on one's experience of the experience of others.

Martha Nussbaum has argued for the inclusion of emotions in ideas and ideals of rationality. Her emphasis is pertinent for this paper, since it energetically discards notions of knowledge that allow only reason narrowly defined (see Nussbaum, 1990, 1995). It is altogether possible in human experience (but not in rational categories) to "know" and to "somewhat know" and "not to know" in overlapping ways, a fact of human experience that has consequences for any concept of the unconscious (Kilborne, 2014).⁴ When we feel we do not know, and are ashamed of our ignorance, such feelings can prompt us to express our dismay to others. And this expression of dismay can evoke a response. Our shame and discomfort, our fear of isolation and abandonment, can prompt us to connect with others, bringing us closer together and strengthen human bonds. "Not knowing", depending on others to know and not to know, can provide us with resources of empathy. Shame over incompleteness humanizes, evokes kindness, strengthens our ties to others and constitutes the essence of empathy. Acknowledging that we do not know, that we are weak, or

helpless or vulnerable in any way requires imagination (see: Kilborne, 1999; Hoffer and Buie, 2016).

Aristotle's theory of *katharsis* (often translated as a combination of pity and fear) reminds us that no man is an island, and that we are all social animals with needs for an Other. For Aristotle, human connections come with ethical (social) responsibilities. The pity and fear that Aristotle speaks of in his *Poetics* are intended to instill awe in the spectators and encourage identification with the suffering of tragic figures; it nourishes empathy by stretching the bounds of the self. For Aristotle, tragic emotions stoke the fires of imagination that, in turn, allow for empathy and are antidotes to narcissism because of the ethical responsibilities they entail.

FREUD, DEFENSES AND SHAME

In 'The psychotherapy of hysteria' (the concluding section of *Studies on Hysteria* (Freud and Breuer, 1893–95)), Freud addresses the difficulties his patients have in making pathogenic ideas conscious, and writes that he realized he "had to overcome a psychical force" (Freud, 1893, p. 268) in his patients, a force he called "resistance." Continuing to reflect on what makes ideas pathogenic, he writes, "I recognized a universal characteristic of such ideas: they were all of a distressing nature, calculated to arouse the affects of shame, of self-reproach and of psychical pain, and the feeling of being harmed" (p. 296). From this thought he goes on for the first time to speak of censorship and of defenses. Here, I think, Freud is clearly in the middle of our topic: shame, superego conflicts, incompatible ideas, and those things that are known and not known at the same time. Freud's genius shines through these lines and has been a beacon for psychoanalysts ever since, although his concept of defenses and censorship became unnecessarily limited by his theories of dream interpretation. Because Freud relied on dreams as text, his conception of language, relationships and interpretation got in the way of a more flexible and faithful, clinically oriented notion of defenses. Implicitly, Freud is evoking a concept of the unconscious filled with shameful forces that we all try to keep from knowing.

While by claiming that "distressing" ideas can be "calculated" to arouse shame Freud would seem to impute intent to ideas, he may also be suggesting that ideas can be motivated by feelings. This brings us back to the concept of William James (1879) that rationality itself is no more than a feeling of what fits, a feeling which calls out to be defined "rationally." Were there no feeling behind the idea, the idea could not exist.⁵ What then are the feelings behind the "universal characteristic" of ideas? For Freud in this passage, they are feelings of self-reproach, shame and harm.

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By implication then, what is universal is not the ideas but rather the feelings that the ideas are attempting to make "understandable," feelings connected to what is not understandable, to feeling that one cannot or must not know something. This not-knowing constitutes the ground on which any figure of a comprehensible idea can appear.⁶

ANDRE BRETON, FREUD AND THE IMAGINATION

Intentionally or unintentionally, Freud blazed the way to variegated ignorance, and opened up the entire subject of knowing and motivated ignorance (easily confused) in ways that have inspired not only psychoanalysts but writers and artists ever since. For example, the Surrealist André Breton in France used Freud as one of the primary reference points for his theories of Surrealism (Breton, 1924). Breton says explicitly that Surrealism draws upon the Freudian notion of the unconscious, which he essentially equates with the imagination, and that consequently artists are just as justified in utilizing psychoanalysis as is psychoanalysis itself. "The imagination is perhaps on the point of reasserting itself, of reclaiming its rights," Breton adds (cited in Lomas, 2000, p. 2).

Nonetheless, Freud appears not to have grasped what Breton was referring to. Freud declined an invitation of Breton's to contribute to a collection of dreams, explaining that without associations dreams were not dreams. "That which I call the 'manifest' dream is not of interest to me..." Freud declares, "and I can hardly imagine what it could say to others" (cited in Lomas, 2000, p. 5). Freud is clear: the imaginative content of the manifest dream is not his concern. No dream is worth paying attention to if it is not interpretable, i.e., if the manifest content is not bypassed.

By supposing that only the latent content is "real" and "useful", Freud reveals his kinship with the French linguistic tradition, with the structuralists for whom what is interpretable depends upon structure and rules, and what is not interpretable either does not exist or is of no consequence at all. Freud (1900) writes: "There are particular difficulties in observing dreams, and the only way of escaping all errors in such matters is to put down upon paper with the least possible delay what we have just experienced or observed. Otherwise, forgetfulness, whether total or partial quickly supervenes" (p. 46). And the structuralists herald Lacan, for whom the unconscious is structured like a language, organized by a grammar.

Thinking is thereby tied to a linguistic model (thinking is knowing and knowing has a grammar). Such an approach curtails the recognition of the limits of language and fosters a sort of linguistic omnipotence and linguistic hegemony that goes in rather an opposite direction to the one Breton had

assumed. Such an inflation of the epistemological status of language stokes the fires of that peculiarly French preoccupation with making the rational irrational and the irrational rational.⁷ For Freud, interpretation (including the interpretation of the irrational) relies on what is assumed to be rational and comprehensible, and only that can be admitted to exist. But what does this do to the concept of the imagination that Breton and others assumed Freud was championing?

FREUD, DREAMS AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

Significantly, Freud's claim to the "truth" and "knowing" about dreams as defined by what he could interpret as latent content omits the interpersonal and social context of dream telling. As I have emphasized many times,⁸ the dream is not a dream until it is told, and then it will inevitably be influenced by the person to whom it is told, under what circumstances and for what purposes both conscious and unconscious.

As such, the dream is *in status nascendi* until it has been heard and responded to, and often not until there have been subsequent dreams to continue the unconscious processes expressed by the first dream. This is why it is often more important to have a sequence of dreams than their associations. Obviously, the associative method is useful, but it does not constitute the *sine qua non* of dream interpretation in the way Freud believed, if only because the dream is an essential gateway to the imagination, and cannot be defined in the manner of either literary interpretation (hermeneutics) or science.

Dreams are necessarily in motion, between individuals, constantly changing as they are thought of, and necessarily incomplete. Freud seeks to freeze them and examine them under a microscope, assuming that he is seeing what others believe he sees, or leading them to assume that what he calls attention to is all that really exists. In his later work Freud increasingly assumes that there is a reality that psychoanalysis is called upon to describe, and that the senses are little more than optical or auditory devices (not unlike the telescope or microscope), quite distinct from the others. By implication Freud compared the invention of psychoanalysis with the invention of the microscope. Both opened onto a previously unknown world. But, as I hope to make clear, this comparison does not hold.

By emphasizing psychic reality and reality testing, concepts later elaborated by the Ego Psychologists, Freud and others departed from Freud's early preoccupation with imagination, defenses, not knowing, intuition and the occult. The waters became ever more murky when analysts sought to link psychic reality to natural science explanations, like

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Darwin's study of the fossil Cirripede Crustacea on which he lavished eight years of his life. Darwin's influential *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, published in 1872, fit neatly into the frame of natural history explanations, equipped with an impartial and fastidious but altogether invisible observer. Freud shared with Darwin an enormous curiosity about the way the world can be understood, the enthusiasm for discovery being reinforced for both men by the scientific optimism of the time. But Freud also tended to assume that in order to be respectable, the scientist had to be invisible, an unseeing eye, a microscope. This was, perhaps, one of the many reasons for his use of the couch and for his need for associations rather than another person who could listen to his dreams.

Assumptions underlying the use of the couch can usefully be re-examined in the light of our emphasis on the imagination. The couch, it is often assumed, enables analysands better to imagine themselves and their analyst because they cannot see the analyst. Yet it can also be argued that inhibitions in looking do not necessarily enliven the imagination. As with any element of the analytic situation, the couch too can inhibit analysis by using what is not looked at in the service of defense. For example, anxiety over the unavailability of parental figures, together with experiences of non-responsiveness to injury, can be exacerbated by the position of the couch. In such cases the patient's injuries can be overlooked in favor of the exercise of analytic technique (see Kelman, 1954).

But if not looking does not necessarily stimulate the imagination neither does looking, since we never exercise one sense alone, and must use all five simultaneously. When we see, we feel, smell, listen, and touch. Added to these are the activities of our imaginations themselves profoundly influenced by relationships and Object Relations. In short, the relation between looking, not looking, imagination and defenses proves to be particularly fertile ground for greater exploration.

NOT-KNOWING AND SHAME

Ignorance, as a feeling, can inspire humility, just as knowledge, as a feeling, can lead to arrogance. Nearly a century and a half ago William James defined rationality as "the feeling of what fits." Accordingly, if knowledge is a feeling rather than what one can be said to "know" intellectually, then assumptions about "knowledge" can stand in the way of imagining beyond what fits.⁹

We all know that children learn foreign languages more easily than adults because they do not have as much of their own mother tongue to stand in the way. Can we not argue that their ignorance allows them more

flexibility and openness in acquiring foreign languages? The imagination we associate with childhood may have something to do with how much more creatively children can fit things together, and how free is their imagination because they feel they know so little. Also, children are freer to fit things together because they do not prejudge and evaluate their own efforts as relentlessly as adults; their superegos tend not to get in the way quite as much.

In imaging themselves, children naturally rely on what they feel and imagine to be the image of themselves in the minds of those on whom they depend. These shifting, interrelated and interdependent identities are in constant flux. As Theresa Benedict noted long ago,

The child at birth is an enigma. He represents hope and promise for self-realisation and at the same time he forewarns that he may expose not one's virtues but one's faults (Benedict, 1959, p. 415).

The same could be said of analyst and analysand, each dependent on the other for those reassuring (or disquieting) signs of recognition. When we ask ourselves, how does a particular patient appear to us, or how we appear to a particular patient, the answer is far from either obvious or simple.¹⁰

The problems of appearance, seeing and blindness, become ever more complicated when one considers the possibility of imagining with another sense what one is sensing with any one. When we "see" the Munch painting, "the Scream", it triggers our imaginations of what we simultaneously hear. We do not only look as we think and think as we look, we also bring into the process all of our senses. So, we taste what we hear, hear what we see, touch what we smell, etc. And the addition of the imagination seriously compounds the possibilities (Kilborne, 2009).

The debate over the nature of psychoanalysis, the struggle over its soul, revolves around the nature of knowing, not knowing as well as of imagined knowing and not-knowing in both analyst and analysand. Without these dimensions of imagination, knowing is incomplete. The bridge from (merely rational) knowledge to ethics, social responsibility and empathy depends directly on shame: the shame of our own limitations and our imaginations of shameful feelings. As Rousseau (1763) writes in *Emile, Book IV*:

It is the weakness of the human being that makes us sociable; it is our common miseries that turn our hearts to humanity; we would owe humanity nothing if we were not human. Every attachment is a sign of insufficiency. If each of us had no need of others, he would hardly think of uniting himself with them. Thus from our weakness our fragile happiness is born (Rousseau, 1763, Book IV).¹¹

So, the imagination plays a fundamental role in our experience of understanding, of not knowing, and in the dynamics of empathy and shame,

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a role insufficiently appreciated. For example, Bollas (1987) simplifies these dynamics with a catchy phrase: the *unthought known*. Others tilt the discussion towards the scientific and empirical. But far, far more is required of us as analysts if we are to be faithful to the human experience and to our patients, if we are firmly to engage the imagination of our patients in the analytic process, and to fire the imaginations of our colleagues and the society at large.

A Sophist might begin by saying that those who know themselves know how little they understand about themselves. For the sophist it is knowledge of one's ignorance (together with the shame that produces) that would define the psychoanalytic task: self-knowledge. We might go further and suggest that the distinction between what is known, half known and unknown melts away when looked at carefully. What matters is not the kind of knowledge or ignorance (and how much of either one is dealing with). Rather it is the ways these variations of knowing and ignorance are *imagined, felt, and communicated*.

IMAGINATIVE KNOWING

What, then, is imaginative knowing? It would include the imagination of ignorance, both the fact and the feeling, together with feelings about whatever gradations of knowledge or ignorance are experienced at any one time. So imaginative knowing implies knowing what is beyond the usual scope of knowledge. Therefore, it necessarily includes intuition as well as skepticism about the reliability of what one can present as the data of the known. Our religious traditions provide reminders that it is possible to attempt to know the unknowable, and to define what is unknown through feelings of awe and human limitation.

But we do not have to be religious to recognize the value of feeling what is unknown. This necessarily elicits shame in us all, and especially in those whose ideals of themselves allow little room for ignorance.¹² Ignorance narrowly construed increases the reliance on definitions of the knowable and, implicitly, on the appearance of knowing. Imaginative knowing relieves us of too great a dependency on either the known, the true, or the certain, allows us to be equally curious and skeptical about what we know and what we don't, widening the scope of our humanity. In so doing it constitutes a creative and imaginative response to the shame of human limitation and to human tragedy.

OEDIPUS, BLINDNESS, NOT-KNOWING AND SHAME

Let us now take these ideas about Katharsis, appearance, imagination, shame, knowing and unknowing, and bring them to bear on the Freudian notion of the Oedipus Complex and the tragedy of Oedipus. The psychoanalytic tradition has associated Oedipal dynamics with guilt and, more explicitly still, with drives (the drive to kill the father and possess the mother, for boys, and vice versa for girls). However, the tragedy of Oedipus stems from more than the horror and shame over acts unwittingly committed (killing his father and marrying his mother). The analytic emphasis on aggression avoids an essential dimension of the tragedy by pinning guilt and responsibility on Oedipus who does not know his father is his father or his mother is his mother. Oedipus must face his blindness to who he is and to who he has been, and come to terms with how seriously he has misunderstood himself. To miss the central importance of blindness as blindness (and not castration anxiety), turns a blind eye to shame and human limitation while focusing on guilt in their place.

Oedipus has to guess the riddle of the sphinx. What he needs to know about himself to prevail in the world of his own making he does not know. He turns a blind eye to the shame of impending defeat by parents and forces beyond his control or knowledge. In this sense he is the *wise baby* of Ferenczi (1923, 1933) who feigns wisdom so as to comfort those on whom he depends (his people) by confounding them about his own helplessness. But such tactics, whether of Oedipus or of the wise baby, are like houses built on sand: they cannot withstand adversity. Both run the risk of announcing to the world a power that does not exist, which then makes the claimant prone to toxic shame and suicidal rage.

Two other elements of the Oedipus story deserve to be mentioned: the blind Tiresias and the Delphic oracle. Both serve as reminders that sense perceptions alone (seeing is believing) can never be enough, and that there is an essential world lying beyond the senses available to those who "see". Strikingly, Freud the scientist evoked divine revelation when he wrote in the *Interpretation of Dreams*: "In This House, on July 24th, 1895 the Secret of Dreams was revealed to Dr. Sigm. Freud" (p. 121) (capital letters in original text). However, although Freud clearly realized the importance of the mystery religions to the Greco-Roman and Near Eastern world (e.g., the Eleusian, Orphic, Samothracian, Dionysian, and Mythraic),¹³ and the indisputable importance of the blind Tiresias for the Sophoclean play, neither one plays any significant part in his discussion of the Oedipus complex.

Let me open a short parenthesis here. Much that is implied and designated by the terms castration or fragmentation anxiety falls short of what we see clinically. In our clinical work fears of fragmentation come up

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against adult ego ideals and reliance on appearance, against narcissism and assumptions about coherence. Oedipus has his superego notions of what makes him powerful and admired: he is king of Thebes, looked up to by all. But what is he to do with the fragmentation anxiety triggered by having been abandoned as a child? All this comes into conflict with his assumptions about who he is and who he needs to be.

To be overwhelmed by affective storms and not to have control over conflicting affects leads inevitably to shame, to motivated not-knowing, and to that combination of willfulness and blindness so powerfully symbolized by Oedipus. The shakier the "executive functions" of affect regulation, the more intense the shame over fragility. In such cases shame can be the hallmark of unbearable conflict between ideals and reality as well as among feelings which seem impossibly at odds with each other.

In other words, shame stems from evaluations of one's inadequacy in dealing with overwhelming feelings, in dealing with human tragedy. Evaluations of such overwhelming feelings can be associated with superego judgements. Here we have infantile experiences of childhood helplessness and vulnerability, appearing as fears of helplessness in adults, overlaid with conflicting superego ideals and judgments of these conflicts (one's failings and vulnerability must at all costs be hidden).

I have suggested utilizing the concept of Oedipal shame (as the shame of Oedipus) (Kilborne, 2003) to distinguish these dynamics of the tragedy of Oedipus from those on which Freud concentrated. When the infant or child feels unable to compete with the same sex parent, or suffers sexual trauma at the hands of an adult, toxic, shameful feelings can engender toxic shame. These interactions are strikingly described in Ferenczi's 1933 paper "Confusion of Tongues between adults and the child." Because no child can be in any way a sexual equal of the rival parent, such feelings of inadequacy and an assumed inability to compete can then seriously cripple self-image. Such traumatic effects of Oedipal shame can lead to cycles of humiliating failure, as when Oedipus kills a man he cannot recognize to be his father. What might have been a victory turns sinister and becomes a defeat, as is the case in the Ajax of Sophocles.

What can we now summarize to be the hallmarks of Oedipal shame? So far, we have a feeling of not being able (worthy) to compete, of being continually bested, thwarted and, as it were, stopped in one's tracks. We can think here of the small boy whose penis is categorically different from his father's for reasons he cannot understand; he knows he is small and powerless. Such experiences of being inadequate by definition are, it seems to me, fundamental for what has been characterized as castration anxiety which is not the literal threat to the penis but rather the shame and anxiety over inadequacy.

OEDIPAL SHAME AND FERENCZI'S DREAM OF THE WISE BABY

As Ferenczi's concept of the wise baby suggests, relationships depend upon shame dynamics, and can be thwarted by narcissistic regression. In the case of traumatic regression, what is being "regressed" to is not what once was, but some untoward combination of overwhelming (often conflicting) feelings together with the helplessness they trigger, and the adult's judgment of these feelings. Regressive states can be directly associated with overwhelming Oedipal shame from which the individual seeks relief through a sort of disappearance of the self and self-annihilation.¹⁴

Therefore, there is deep shame in the consciousness that a trauma is actually happening, shame over the complicity which, unwittingly, the child has entered into with the very people responsible for his undoing (Ferenczi, 1932, p. 163). When a helpless child is mistreated and the suffering exceeds the bounds of the small person's power of comprehension, he comes to be *beside* himself, a state of 'not-being', of having disappeared.¹⁵

Ferenczi's notion of the dream of the wise baby entails the denial of helplessness and overwhelming anxiety, just as does the story of Oedipus, who becomes king of Thebes. The wise baby and Oedipus both believe they can rule and be admired by all for wisdom, poise, and power. They both believe that they are not blind. But behind the facade lie infantile experiences of trauma and chaos, which can threaten to undo even the most craftily devised appearances. Experiences that outstrip human understanding cannot be papered over by appearance or the result is shameful instability; one waits for the other shoe to drop. The tenuousness of hidden omnipotence thus serves as a shadow over the sense of self (Kilborne, 2011).

Ferenczi's concept of the wise baby (1923, 1933) conjoins the disjunctive images of wisdom and baby, the way the image of a sphinx conjoins the disjunctive images of lion and woman. It seems fitting, therefore, to compare Ferenczi's wise baby with the tragedy of Oedipus, who had to ponder the riddle of the sphinx. He was "wise" enough to get the right answer. But, at heart, he was a helpless infant, unable to understand what had befallen him. That inability proved to be his undoing as, in Oedipus at Colonus, recognition of his helplessness and shame restored his human dignity.

NOTES

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2. Strikingly, then, Freud's unconscious is individual, while Augustine's abyssus depends upon what others cannot know of us, which means that it is dependent on others and relationships. Not so surprisingly then Freud's concept of the unconscious unnecessarily shrinks these vast places (Peter Brown personal communication, 2016).
3. While Freud himself never appears to have written about telling his dreams to another person, Jung wrote that while crossing the Atlantic to America, on their way to deliver their lectures at Clark University in 1909, Freud and Jung occasionally took turns to tell their dreams each other and interpreted them, until Freud refused to free associate to one of his dreams and said if he did so he would lose his authority (see Spurling, 2003; Tilander, 1991).
4. Before Freud began writing, before he developed the concept of the Unconscious, Pierre Janet (1923) had developed the concept of double conscience. Janet focused on how we both know and do not know at the same time, a focus that apparently complicated or threatened to compromise Freud's theories of defenses.
5. Yet the criteria of rationality are being used to define what is understandable, creating a daunting feedback loop.
6. Behind "knowing", behind rational knowledge, there are feelings of knowing and not knowing, together with feelings of not knowing what we might have known and feelings of knowing what we thought we knew.
7. A dream not reducible to an interpretable text is not worth bothering about. And for Freud, only the latent content is interpretable. In this he is inheriting the tradition of truth-interpretation over experience, a tradition represented by the dream of the Pharaoh interpreted by Joseph. It is Joseph who ultimately derives power from the dream, not Pharaoh.
8. See, for example, my *Interpretation du reve au Maroc* (Claix: La Pensee Sauvage, 1978) and the entry "Dreams" in the Macmillan Encyclopedia of Religion, my book chapter *On Classifying Dreams* [In] *Dreaming: Anthropological and Psychological Interpretations*. (ed) Barbara Tedlock. Sante Fe: School of American Research Press, 1992; and *Fields of Shame* [in] *Freud and Psychoanalytic Anthropology: 50 Years After* (ed. David Spain). Psyche Press, 1992.
9. Unlike Descartes, Vico (1774) explicitly makes perceptions dependent on the emotions, thus calling into doubt the entire Cartesian system. Vico grounds all understanding in the passions. It is the emotions that come first, and whatever understanding we can manage that comes after. For him, human knowledge, perceived through the five senses, is dictated by human concerns and therefore grounded in what men can know—and feel—from the inside. It would certainly appear that James was adapting the primary point of Vico: that

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- rationality (however construed) is determined by perceptions, and perceptions by emotions.
10. And far also from the notion that seeing is knowing, or that there is such a thing as self-evidence. Ever since the 18th century sensualists like Hobbes, Locke, Smith, Kanes, and Ferguson, there has arisen an assumption that seeing is believing, and that the data of the senses can be put forward as the basis of knowledge. With his emphasis on dreams, Freud seemingly challenged the supposed supremacy of sense data as the basis of knowledge, since dreams do not come from waking sense impressions. By emphasizing latent content, Freud asserted the power of interpretation over experience in the tradition of Joseph and Pharaoh. So, for Freud, it is not the sense impressions themselves that can be relied upon, but rather the interpretation of the latent content of dreamed sense impressions.
 11. "C'est la faiblesse de l'homme qui le rend sociable; ce sont nos misères communes qui portent nos coeurs a l'humanité : nous lui devrions rien si nous n'étions pas hommes. Tout attachement est un signe d'insuffisance ; si chacun de nous n'avait nul besoin des autres, il ne songerait guère a s'unir a eux. Ainsi de notre infirmité même nait notre frêle bonheur" (Rousseau, 1763, Book IV, in the original French).
 12. There is, of course, a relationship between trauma and idealization. Among many others, Karen Horney (1945, 1950) focuses on the feeling of being helplessness and alone in a hostile world, and points out how ideals can provide defensive functions.
 13. The Greek word *musteria* refers initially to the mysteries of Eleusis, secret celebrations accessible only to initiates (*mustai*). Freud's distribution of rings to his closest associates, the members of the Secret Committee, seems to echo these mystery rites. With Neoplatonism in its various Christian guises and with Neo-Pythagoreanism, the term designated revealed divine wisdom. Freud's entry here cited suggests that he saw himself as more than an interpreter: he was the recipient of divine truth.
 14. Such states, which make object relations of any sort extremely problematic, often look more narcissistic and/or more paranoid than they necessarily are.
 15. Fears of self-abnegation and disappearance draw upon defenses whose protective functions have ceased to exist, or are experienced to be woefully inadequate. Childhood trauma troubles the outcome of sexual conflicts, leading sometimes to fantasies of psychic disappearance and to appearance anxiety (Ferenczi, 1932, pp. 32–33).

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